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The Aristotelian proto-theory of design  
Lauri Koskela, Ricardo Codinhoto, Patricia Tzortzopoulos, Mike Kagioglou 
Abstract 
In comparing deliberation to the analysis of a geometrical figure, Aristotle 
made a highly significant theoretical statement on design, which has largely gone 
unnoticed.  Through an interpretation of the accounts given by Aristotle and the 
Greek geometer Pappus, seven features of the method of analysis can be identi-
fied, concerning the types of analysis, its stages, its start and end points, the types 
of reasoning involved, the relation of the two directions of reasoning, the strategy 
of reasoning and the targeted outcomes. This proto-theory is compared to the cur-
rent theoretical landscape of design; also it is applied to clarify a current approach 
to conceptual design.  Based on all this, the proto-theory as a theory of design is 
evaluated. It is concluded that the proto-theory fulfills several of the functions of a 
theory in a superior and fertile way. Thus, this proto-theory is not only of histori-
cal interest, but – still – provides a contribution to the theoretical knowledge on 
design. 
Introduction 
In 1993, Cross (1993) stated that the existing design science had contributed lit-
tle to advances of design practice. After that, similar views have been presented by 
many. For example, the NSF Report on Engineering Systems Design Workshop 
(2010) states: “There is a profound need for a normative theory of engineering de-
sign [...] Today, without such a theory, our systems engineering methods, process-
es and tools are a very large edifice built on extraordinarily loose sand.” 
However, in late Antiquity, the medical doctor Galen (AD 129 – c.  216?), 
whose influential writings were to be used for fifteen centuries in medical training, 
praised (what we now would call) a normative theory of engineering design, 
namely adopting the method of analysis and synthesis from geometry to design. 
He showed (Galen 1997) how it is applied in the concrete case of designing and 
making a sun dial, and proposed this theory to be used also in medicine.  
Thus, the theory of design has degenerated from being at the leading edge of 
knowledge at Galen’s time to an almost non-existing entity in our times. What on 
earth happened to it? Is the theory of design known by Galen now hopelessly ob-
solete, as most of his medical knowledge is, or has it been forgotten?  
We contend that the ancient theory of design is not obsolete, but it has been 
forgotten. In this Chapter, we first address the historical questions: What was the 
theory of design known and applied by Galen; how was it originated? Then we 
turn to the question of current interest: Does the ancient theory of design have sig-
nificance still today? 
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Origin of design theorizing 
Aristotle as design theorist 
We contend that the theory of design referred to, applied and further developed 
by Galen has its origin in Aristotle. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (384-322 
BC) states that “the person who deliberates seems to investigate and analyse in the 
way described as though he were analysing a geometrical construction”. Actually, 
this short statement, along with the sentences surrounding it (Table 1) contains a 
powerful view on design – however, several layers of interpretation in light of 
other classical texts are needed for revealing this. 
The first question is whether Aristotle means design here. Indeed, he does not 
use this term for the simple reason that it is of a much more recent origin. Instead, 
he focuses on deliberation, in the sense of figuring out what to do (Cooper 1975). 
In his examples, this deliberation occurs in the framework of production (poiesis), 
which has a wide interpretation: it covers medicine, oratory, shoe making, house 
building, shipbuilding, agriculture, and also artistic activities such as poetry and 
music.  
In the scheme of Aristotle (1924), production has two stages: thinking and 
making:  
Of the productions or processes one part is called thinking and the other making, - that 
which proceeds from the starting-point and the form is thinking, and that which proceeds 
from the final step of the thinking is making. 
He exemplifies this through healing by a doctor; the medical knowledge of Ar-
istotle is obsolete but the concepts and method are clearly visible (Aristotle 1924): 
The healthy subject is produced as the result of the following train of thought:-since this is 
health, if the subject is to be healthy this must first be present, e.g. a uniform state of 
body, and if this is to be present, there must be heat; and the physician goes on thinking 
thus until he reduces the matter to a final something which he himself can produce. Then 
the process from this point onward, i.e. the process towards health, is called a 'making'.  
The similarity of logic (means-ends structure) and subject (healing) in the quot-
ed passage and the focused passage in Nicomachean ethics allows concluding that 
this thinking equates to deliberation. In the case of producing an object, thinking 
arguably includes the mental operations required before any making is possible, 
namely designing (in its colloquial sense, specifying the functional principles, 
form and material of an object) and planning. Thus, when discussing deliberation, 
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Table 1. Aristotle’s account on deliberation in Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle s.a.) 
We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate whether he 
shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman whether he shall pro-
duce law and order, nor does any one else deliberate about his end. They assume the end 
and consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be produced by 
several means they consider by which it is most easily and best produced, while if it is 
achieved by one only they consider how it will be achieved by this and by what means this 
will be achieved, till they come to the first cause, which in the order of discovery is last. For 
the person who deliberates seems to investigate and analyse in the way described as though 
he were analysing a geometrical construction (not all investigation appears to be deliberation 
– for instance mathematical investigations - but all deliberation is investigation), and what is 
last in the order of analysis seems to be first in the order of becoming. And if we come on an 
impossibility, we give up the search, e.g. if we need money and this cannot be got; but if a 
thing appears possible we try to do it. 
Analysing a geometrical construction 
What, then, does “analysing a geometrical construction” mean? This refers to 
the method of analysis in geometry, a sophisticated and well-known procedure al-
ready at Aristotle’s time, although the only written account of it (Table 2), by 
Pappus (AD c. 290 – c. 350), comes from late Antiquity. 
It is useful to briefly outline the procedure contained in the method of analysis 
(Figure 1). In geometry, one typical problem is to construct a given geometrical 
figure using a ruler and a compass (this is the problematical analysis of Pappus). 
The starting point of analysis is to assume the sought figure already done, and to 
consider through which means it can be created, further through which means this 
can be achieved, until one comes to something well known, such as a theorem 
generally known to be true (thus, reasoning in analysis consists of inferences 
backward). This is the end point of analysis, and simultaneously the start point of 
synthesis. In synthesis, one follows, in a deductive manner, the steps taken in 
analysis, but in reverse order, and comes finally to the sought figure. Synthesis 
contains both the construction of the sought figure and its proof. - It has to be 
stressed that the sophistication and richness of the method of analysis is not 
transmitted in such a brief outline. 
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Figure 1. Outline of the method of analysis (problematical analysis). 
Table 2. Pappus’ account on the method of analysis (from Hintikka & Remes 1974) 
Now analysis is the way from what is sought - as if it were admitted - through its concomi-
tants in order to something admitted in synthesis. For in analysis we suppose that which is 
sought to be already done, and we inquire from what it results, and again what is the ante-
cedent of the latter, until we on our backward way light upon something already known and 
being first in order. And we call such a method analysis, as being a solution backwards. In 
synthesis, on the other hand, we suppose that which was reached last in analysis to be al-
ready done, and arranging in their natural order as consequents the former antecedents and 
linking them one with another, we in the end arrive at the construction of the thing sought. 
And this we call synthesis. 
Now analysis is of two kinds. One seeks the truth, being called theoretical. The other 
serves to carry out what was desired to do, and this is called problematical. In the theoretical 
kind we suppose the thing sought as being and as being true, and then we pass through its 
concomitants in order, as though they were true and existent by hypothesis, to something 
admitted; then, if that which is admitted be true, the thing sought is true, too, and the proof will 
be the reverse of analysis. But if we come upon something false to admit, the thing sought 
will be false, too. In the problematical kind we suppose the desired thing to be known, and 
then we pass through its concomitants in order, as though they were true, up to something 
admitted. If the thing admitted is possible or can be done, that is, if it is what the mathemati-
cians call given, the desired thing will also be possible. The proof will again be the reverse of 
analysis. But if we come upon something impossible to admit, the problem will also be impos-
sible. 
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Comparison of deliberation by Aristotle to the method of analysis by Pappus 
A comparison of Aristotle’s account of deliberation and Pappus’ description of 
the method of analysis (Table 3) reveals an astonishing similarity, as noted by 
Hintikka and Remes (1974). Indeed, it can be asked whether Pappus was influ-
enced by Aristotle’s account of deliberation, but this is hardly probable as the 
method of analysis was the paramount methodological resource for Greek geome-
ters and Pappus, a practitioner of the method of analysis, must have absorbed it 
from his teachers and prior mathematical treatises. Indeed, Menn (2002) argues 
that the same logical description of analysis that we find in Pappus was already 
available in Plato’s and Aristotle’s time. 
Table 3. Comparison of deliberation and analysis. 
Aristotle’s description of deliberation Corresponding parts in Pappus’  
description of the method of analysis 
They assume the end  
 
 
and consider how and by what means it is to 
be attained;  
 
and if it seems to be produced by several 
means they consider by which it is most 
easily and best produced,  
 
while if it is achieved by one only they con-
sider how it will be achieved by this and by 
what means this will be achieved,  
 
till they come to the first cause, which in the 
order of discovery is last.  
 
For the person who deliberates seems to in-
vestigate and analyse in the way described 
as though he were analysing a geometrical 
construction (not all investigation appears to 
be deliberation- for instance mathematical 
investigations- but all deliberation is investi-
gation),  
 
and what is last in the order of analysis 
seems to be first in the order of becoming. 
 
 
 
And if we come on an impossibility, we give 
up the search, e.g. if we need money and 
this cannot be got; but if a thing appears 
possible we try to do it. 
For in analysis we suppose that which is 
sought to be already done,   
 
and we inquire from what it results,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
and again what is the antecedent of the lat-
ter,  
 
 
until we on our backward way light upon 
something already known and being first in 
order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In synthesis, on the other hand, we suppose 
that which was reached last in analysis to be 
already done, and [] we in the end arrive at 
the construction of the thing sought. 
 
But if we come upon something false to ad-
mit, the thing sought will be false, too. 
 
When describing deliberation, Aristotle refers to all the steps of the method of 
analysis, as later described by Pappus (and presents one additional step not cov-
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ered by Pappus). Deliberation starts in the same way as analysis, proceeds through 
the same steps, and even ends similarly. Arguably, Aristotle claims that delibera-
tion and analysis are throughout similar or analogous, from beginning to end. In 
relation to this claim, several implications and consequential questions arise. 
Implications from the viewpoint of design 
Thus, in proposing that the person who deliberates seems to investigate and an-
alyse as though he were analysing a geometrical construction, Aristotle presents 
the first theory – proto-theory – of design. It encompasses the claim that design is 
similar, or analogous, to geometric analysis. This proto-theory was influential still 
in late Antiquity, as Galen’s example shows, but fell then into oblivion. 
Did Aristotle mean that just the topics explicitly mentioned by him are similar 
between design and geometrical analysis, or does the remark imply an overall, 
deeper structural similarity? The rhetorical figure he used, from beginning to end, 
would pinpoint to the latter alternative. Likewise, the character of his writings as 
lecture notes (Barnes 2000) suggests taking the overall similarity as the hypothet-
ical starting point: it falls to us to establish the extent of similarity. 
What, according to Aristotle, is the degree of similarity between design and 
analysis? Not much can be concluded regarding this question. Several stages of 
deliberation seem to be similar to their counterparts in analysis; however, the 
wording “as though he were analysing a geometrical construction” allows a looser 
analogy, too. 
Interpreting the method of analysis as a theory of design leads to the question, 
whether it is a descriptive or prescriptive theory. Aristotle’s wording itself refers 
to a descriptive account; however, the method of analysis is a prescriptive proce-
dure. Perhaps Aristotle means that expert “deliberators” naturally drift to similar 
steps as in analysis. 
 Why was Aristotle concerned with deliberation as it occurs in production? Sci-
ence of production (techne) was one of the three sciences defined by him, all ex-
pected to provide information about causes. Aristotle recognized four different 
causes: efficient, formal, material and final. Now, this account of deliberation may 
be interpreted as providing explanation on how the final cause comes to be in pro-
duction. As final cause had the explanatory priority, this was an important piece in 
the scientific edifice of Aristotle. 
 
Wider questions arising 
 
An account of geometrical analysis and synthesis and of the place given to it by 
Aristotle in the productive science, as presented above, immediately raises several 
wider questions. Given the longstanding and wide interest into Aristotle’s works, 
how can the significance of his remark for design theorizing have avoided atten-
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tion up to now? Why has not the understanding of analysis and synthesis as a pre-
cisely defined, ancient method been transmitted to the present day?  
That this Aristotle’s remark is being focused on only now has its explanation 
both at the “supply and demand” side. As already mentioned, the interpretation of 
this remark requires support from other parts of Aristotle’s corpus, and its full sig-
nificance can be grasped only if the method of analysis is understood. This under-
standing has not been widely diffused through the history. Modern theorizing on 
design started only in the 1960’s. Neither now nor fifty years ago has it been usual 
to look for Aristotle as a source for theorizing. 
The relative disappearance of the original understanding of geometric analysis 
is due to several factors, which can be only briefly outlined here. Although the 
method of analysis had been fundamental for the initial development of geometry, 
philosophy of science (the scientific method) and productive science, all these dis-
ciplines failed to maintain understanding on their roots. In geometry and mathe-
matics, the success of the geometric analysis in stimulating further advances, es-
pecially infinitesimal calculus, dwarfed Euclidean geometry, and new meanings 
were given to the term analysis. In natural science, Enlightenment led to an anti-
Aristotelian sentiment and the emphasis shifted to empirical studies, from the con-
sideration of classical texts where the geometric roots of the scientific method are 
explained. In turn, productive science, techne, encountered a discontinuation: alt-
hough productive science was well known in late Antiquity, it was not widely rec-
ognised in the Renaissance and fell into oblivion. Altogether, these developments 
effectively removed understanding on geometric analysis from the public domain. 
The current significance of the proto-theory of design 
What is the current – rather than historical – significance of this proto-theory of 
design? This question is examined in four steps. First, we have to settle what we 
now know about the method of analysis. Secondly, we compare that to the current 
theoretical landscape of design. Third, we report a case of utilizing understanding 
on the proto-theory to clarify a current approach to conceptual design.  Fourthly, 
based on all this, we evaluate the proto-theory as a theory of design and draw the 
conclusions regarding its significance. 
What is the method of analysis, understood as the proto-theory of 
design? 
The method of analysis was well known and practiced in Antiquity, but in 
modern times, the interest has mostly been towards understanding and reconstruct-
ing it. Besides Aristotle’s and Pappus’ accounts, examples of ancient geometric 
practice (like those presented by Euclid and Pappus) and the interpretation tradi-
tion in the Middle Ages (Beaney 2009, Raftopoulos 2003) may give insights to 
this method. Lastly, current examinations of the method of analysis in mathemat-
ics and philosophy of science (for example, Hintikka & Remes 1974, Hintikka 
2011, Polya 2004) provide useful directions. 
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Drawing from these sources (Table 4), although mainly from ancient descrip-
tions, seven features of the method of analysis can be extracted: 
Table 4. Justification for the pinpointed features of the method of analysis. 
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1. Two types of analysis: problematical and theoretical. 
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2. Two stages in analysis: selecting among different means, and complet-
ing the analysis regarding the selected means. 
3. The qualitative difference between the start point and the end point of 
analysis. 
4. Three types of reasoning in two directions: in analysis, regressive in-
ferences, decomposition and transformation; in synthesis, deductive 
inferences, composition and (reverse) transformation.  
5. The unity of the two directions of reasoning. 
6. Two strategies of reasoning: in analysis heuristic and iterative, in syn-
thesis predetermined. 
7. Two targeted outcomes: finding a solution or showing that a solution 
is impossible. 
In the following, each of these is described in more detail. For clarity, the same 
numbering as above will be used throughout the paper. 
1. Two types of analysis 
According to Pappus, there are two types of analysis: theoretical and problem-
atical.  Problematical analysis aims at constructing a wished geometrical figure 
whereas theoretical analysis aims at proving a theorem. These are, in Polya’s 
(2004) generalised terms, the problem to find (a certain object, the unknown of the 
problem) and the problem to prove (an assertion true or false). 
2. Two stages in analysis  
Aristotle states: “if it seems to be produced by several means they consider by 
which it is most easily and best produced, while if it is achieved by one only they 
consider how it will be achieved by this and by what means this will be achieved”. 
This suggests that in the common case of several means, there are two stages: first 
selecting the best means among different alternatives and then completing the 
analysis regarding the selected means, through a chain of inferences. This feature 
is related to the general tendency towards economizing. That it is not mentioned 
by Pappus may be explained by the fact that there is no specific mathematical 
method in play, rather the question is about a judgment; furthermore, in mathemat-
ical problem solving, the need for economizing is not a central issue. Neverthe-
less, Aristotle seems to have thought that this step of deliberation is also part of 
the method of analysis. 
3. The qualitative difference between the start and end points of analysis 
Pappus’ description implies that the start and end points of analysis are qualita-
tively different. Regarding the start point in theoretical analysis, that is the “thing 
sought”, we do not know whether it exists and is true, but assume that. Instead, the 
end point consists of something admitted, that is, already known. In geometry, ax-
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ioms and theorems already proven provide a body of admitted things. In turn, syn-
thesis provides the proof that the “thing sought” is existent and true. Correspond-
ingly, in problematical analysis we do not know the “desired thing”, but assume it 
to be known. 
4. Three types of reasoning in two directions 
Pappus makes it clear that reasoning in analysis involves inferences backwards 
and also Aristotle refers to this kind of reasoning in the passage from Nicomache-
an Ethics. Such inferences backwards are called regressive analysis.  
Two other types of reasoning are evident in the interpretation tradition (Beaney 
2009) and they can be also deduced from ancient practice. Thus, analysis also 
comprises transformational aspects, where the original problem is transformed in-
to another form for facilitating its solution (Beaney 2009). In geometric analysis, 
the use of auxiliary lines is the main form of this type of procedure. Moreover, a 
decompositional (or configurational) analysis is usually also involved (Hintikka 
and Remes 1974; Byrne 1997). In geometry, the question is about investigating 
from which parts (lines, angles, points, etc.) a figure is made up, and which rela-
tions exist between those parts.  
Regarding synthesis (called proof by him), Pappus says that it is the reverse of 
analysis. Thus, the three types of reasoning of synthesis are carried out in reverse 
order compared to analysis. 
5. Unity of the two directions of reasoning 
According to Pappus, both directions of reasoning are needed: in analysis, 
backwards for the solution, and in synthesis, forwards for the proof or the con-
struction of the desired figure. 
6. Two strategies of reasoning 
In Pappus’ description, the method in itself does not provide detailed guidance 
on which particular moves one should carry out in analysis, except regarding the 
targeted end point: something admitted which is true or possible or can be done. 
Thus, analysis is heuristic rather than algorithmic and obviously often leads to an 
iterative approach of trial and error. In contrast, the synthesis stage is predeter-
mined in the sense that it mirrors the (successful steps of) analysis, even if in re-
verse order. 
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7. Two targeted outcomes 
Obviously, the main target of an analysis is to find a solution. However, Pappus 
also claims that the analysis stage can end up showing that a solution to the prob-
lem at hand is impossible. Although his wording is laconic and vague, it is reason-
able to assume that he refers to reductio ad absurdum, a well-known technique in 
ancient geometry.  It creates a proof of a thesis by argumentation that derives a 
contradiction from its negation (Rescher 2005). 
 
Concluding remark 
 
In summary, it can be stated that these seven features of the method of analysis 
provide guidance and a flexible methodical arsenal for the geometer on how to 
approach the task, how to structure it, where to start and where to stop, which are 
the possible reasoning strategies and moves as well as what to target. It is in this 
sense that the method of analysis is suggested to provide a proto-theory of design: 
the thesis is that this guidance and methodical arsenal would apply also to design. 
How does the proto-theory compare to the current theoretical land-
scape on design? 
In view of the arguments just made, the crucial question addressed is: Do the 
features of the proto-theory have similar or analogous counterparts in the current 
methodical and theoretical landscape of design? Namely, it can be assumed that if 
the features of the method of analysis are relevant to design, those features would 
have surfaced in recent methodical and theoretical design literature. 
1. Two types of analysis 
Briefly stated, the two types of analysis include finding (a solution) and proving 
(an assertion, say, on the validity of a proposed solution). The main difference of 
these is that in the former, one endeavours to create a chain of inferences from the 
problem towards a solution, whereas in the latter a solution is first guessed and 
then analyzed for its validity. In design literature, analogous approaches have been 
called problem-oriented and solution-oriented strategies, and it is recognized that 
completing a design requires the application of both (Wynn and Clarkson 2005). 
The many stage models of design, some positing that analysis precedes synthesis 
(Asimow 1962), some that synthesis precedes analysis (Hall 1962), have tried to 
accommodate and clarify both types, with varying success (it is important to note 
that in these models the meanings of analysis and synthesis have drastically drifted 
from the sense these terms are used in geometry). 
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2. Two stages in analysis  
The two stages in analysis, of selecting a means among different alternatives and 
completing the analysis regarding the selected means, of course correspond to the 
dichotomy between conceptual design and embodiment/detail design (for exam-
ple, Roozenburg & Eekels 1995). In the former, one tries to find the best solution 
in principle; in the latter, one endeavors to translate that into a practical solution. 
Morphological analysis (Ritchey 2006) and parameter analysis (Kroll & al. 2001) 
provide examples of approaches that have endeavoured to develop methods for 
conceptual design. 
3. The difference between the start and end points of analysis 
The philosopher Schütz (1943) proposed the concept of future perfect in rela-
tion to the theory of action: “So we have to place ourselves mentally in a future 
state of affairs which we consider already as realized…” This proposal, which has 
been used in the design domain, is similar to Pappus’ general description of the 
start point of analysis: “For in analysis we suppose that which is sought to be al-
ready done, and we inquire from what it results…” 
However, there is a newer proposal in the design field that comes near this fea-
ture. Hatchuel and Weil (2002) take it as their “fundamental proposition” that de-
sign reasoning must always make a distinction between two related spaces: the 
space of concepts and the space of knowledge. A concept (C) is defined as a prop-
osition that has no logical status, i.e., we cannot know whether it is true or false. In 
turn, propositions in the knowledge space (K) have a logical status, and clearly the 
most interesting knowledge is what is known to be true. Design is defined as a 
process by which a concept generates other concepts or is transformed into 
knowledge. Thus, in the C-K theory, design is conceptualized by its start (C) and 
end points (K), which have similar characteristics as the start and end points in 
analysis. The C-K theory expands then knowledge about what occurs between the-
se points. 
4. Three types of reasoning in two directions 
Regressive and deductive inferences equal, respectively, to backward and for-
ward reasoning, as widely identified in the design domain. As an example, Quality 
Function Deployment embodies the chain of regressive inferences from the re-
quirements to the product design. Decompositional and compositional inferences 
refer to breaking down and putting together. Such types of reasoning are often ar-
gued to exist in design (e.g. Pahl and Beitz 1996). Indeed, Product Breakdown 
Structure is a pure application of decomposition. In transformational inferences, 
the problem is transformed into another problem for facilitating its solution. This 
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idea is used in TRIZ (Cavallucci 2002), where a particular problem to be solved is 
abstracted to a more general level, at which the knowledge about inventive oppor-
tunities lies. 
5. The unity of the two directions 
The Vee model, developed in the framework of systems engineering (Stevens et 
al. 1998) and recently diffused in software engineering and project management 
(Forsberg et al. 2005), similarly implies two directions of reasoning. 
6. Two strategies of reasoning 
The view that the design process is heuristic and iterative, as in analysis, is now 
wide-spread (e.g. Pahl and Beitz 1996; Hubka and Eder 1987; Cross 2000). How-
ever, this was a new idea in the 1980´s, as evident from the observations of many 
who reported that, in practice, the designers unpredictably move between goals 
and means, instead of a linear, one-way process (e.g. Cross 2000, Rasmussen et al. 
1994). The axiomatic design approach as presented by Suh (2001) represents an 
attempt to facilitate this heuristic and iterative search through rules. The pre-
determined deductive process of synthesis, in turn, is present in the right wing of 
the Vee model. 
7. Two targeted outcomes 
As all other parts and aspects of the method of analysis are geared towards 
finding a solution, the interest here in the impossibility of it. In engineering de-
sign, it has been found that requirements set based on customer wishes may be un-
realistic (Ramaswamy & Ulrich 1993); engineering models are proposed as a 
means for pinpointing the impossibility of a solution. More generally, a feasibility 
analysis stage has been suggested (Asimow 1962) for dealing with this issue. 
Concluding remarks 
Several interesting observations and insights stand out. First, for all the features 
explicitly, or implicitly, contained in the method of analysis, we can pinpoint 
modern, corresponding ideas, concepts and methods, many very recently redis-
covered (Table 5). This adds to the validity of the method of analysis as a theory 
of design. Second, without exception, the modern concepts and practices have 
been forwarded by their originators without any reference to the ancient counter-
parts – clearly, due to ignorance of them. Further, insights into the breadth and 
depth of the proto-theory as well as into its use for analyzing the evolution of de-
sign methodology can be made – these are discussed below. 
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Table 5. Proto-theory vs. current theories and methods. 
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Use of the proto-theory for clarification of a current approach to 
design 
In (Kroll & Koskela 2012), research endeavouring to interpret the parameter 
analysis (PA) methodology of conceptual design (Kroll et al. 2001) through the 
reconstructed proto-theory of design is reported.  
From the viewpoint of parameter analysis, the notions of the proto-theory are 
found to create added clarity when applied to this contemporary design approach. 
Especially, they allow interpreting each of the parameter analysis steps separately 
in terms of the types of reasoning involved. Also it is clarified that reasoning 
backwards towards a solution and reasoning forwards towards the proof are inte-
grated into one process. 
In turn, from the viewpoint of the proto-theory, it is of interest that most fea-
tures of the proto-theory can be connected to steps or aspects in PA. This, for its 
part, empirically adds to the validity of the proto-theory. Second, the proto-theory 
is helpful in pinpointing aspects or parts of a suggested design process that remain 
implicit or not fully elaborated. Arguably, this is related to the prevailing relative 
lack of precise notions to describe design reasoning in detail. Third, the examina-
tion of PA provides evidence on the role of the proto-theory as a useful reference: 
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for example, a novel strategy of reasoning in PA (focus on those parts of the prob-
lem where uncertainty can be most steeply reduced) could readily be identified 
when it was compared to the corresponding feature of the proto-theory. 
In addition, this research highlighted certain differences of design reasoning in 
comparison to geometric reasoning. For example, in design, reasoning is more of-
ten based on informal logic than in geometry. Furthermore, there seem to be steps 
in PA that do not nicely fall into the proto-theory. Comparison of alternatives be-
longs to such steps. This may indicate that for some aspects and stages of design, 
notions and explanations that go beyond the proto-theory are needed. This is dis-
cussed in the next section. 
Evaluation of the proto-theory as a theory of design 
In (Koskela 2000), it has been argued that general functions of a theory com-
prise explanation, prediction, direction (for further progress) and testing (for valid-
ity). Furthermore, especially in a managerial science, a theory should also provide 
the functions of providing tools for decision and control, communication, learning 
and transfer (to other settings). Due to the novelty of the topic, only a part of these 
functions can be used as a basis of evaluation: explanation, direction, testing, tools 
for decision and control and communication. 
Explanation  
Does the proto-theory provide an explanation on how design can effectively be 
carried out? If yes, is that explanation better than prior explanations?  
The close correspondence of the features of the proto-theory to topics in the 
current theoretical landscape of design arguably indicates that the proto-theory 
provides an explanation on design. Some further remarks on the quality of that ex-
planation can be provided. 
First, regarding the conceptualization of design, the proto-theory seems to pro-
vide a broader explanation than recent design theory proposals, even those with 
practical success, such as axiomatic design (Suh 2001) or the C-K theory 
(Hatchuel and Weil 2003). The former deals with the strategy of regressive and 
decompositional reasoning, for which heuristic (non-proven) rules have been de-
veloped. The latter is oriented around the start (C) and end (K) points of analysis 
(Hatchuel & Weil 2009). In it, the dynamic and interactive nature of the start and 
end points, concepts and knowledge, is accentuated. By formally representing the 
start and end points, the space of concepts (C) and the space of knowledge (K), it 
has been possible to model the revision of object identities in C and the expansion 
of knowledge in K through four operators, three of which arguably are new. How-
ever, despite these advances, both of these approaches orderly cover only one or at 
most two of the several features of the method of analysis. 
Second, this proto-theory can be claimed to be point wise deeper than the pre-
sent body of knowledge on design. It shows the intellectual origin of such practi-
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cally used and popular methods as Vee model and Product Breakdown Structure, 
and gives them an initial explanation by way of a geometric analogue. The theo-
retical basis for these methods has hitherto been totally missing. 
Third, at the outset, the explanation provided by the proto-theory is constrained 
by any intrinsic differences between the two areas: geometry and design. Howev-
er, this does not seem to be a serious limitation: in such cases, it is possible to pro-
ceed through analogical reasoning towards finding the nearest design counterpart 
for a geometrical feature as well as to clarify the difference between the two.  
Direction 
Does the proto-theory give direction for further progress? When comparing 
current design theories and methods to the proto-theory, an interesting pattern of 
evolution is initially revealed (Table 5). Many design theories and methods seem 
to be based on descriptive but somewhat shallow knowledge on some aspect of the 
design process, equalling one feature of the proto-theory. However, only in such 
cases where a single feature of the proto-theory has been expanded and operation-
alised, manifest advances in design theory and/or methodology seem to have been 
made. Axiomatic design and the C-K theory, as discussed above, provide exam-
ples of this. 
This leads to the hypothesis that the development of design theory and method-
ology should concentrate on expanding each feature of the proto-theory, focusing 
first on those where the theoretical and methodical advances have been meagre, 
such as “unity of two directions”. Thus, indeed direction for further progress 
seems to flow from the proto-theory. 
Testing 
Does the proto-theory allow for testing its validity? As the method of analysis 
is relatively precisely defined, this should be generally possible. In principle, it 
would be feasible to empirically test the proto-theory both as a descriptive account 
(do designers use the seven features in their design activities; to which extent there 
are activities or aspects that are beyond the seven features?) and as a prescriptive 
guide (are the design outcomes or the design process improved through the im-
plementation of the proto-theory?). Such studies have not yet been carried out.  
However, based on analysis of Aristotle’s seminal remark, the mentioned ap-
plication of the proto-theory to clarify a current approach, and generally discussed 
features of design, something can be said regarding the question: Are there limita-
tions related to the method of analysis as a proto-theory of design? At least four 
important gaps can be discerned. 
First, the examples used by Aristotle are on design by one individual, analysis 
by one mind. However, design is very rarely an activity that is embodied within 
17 
one individual. Rather, outcomes of design have to be presented to the client, to 
the producer and to other designers. Each designer needs to persuade others that 
his output is the best possible in the situation. This interaction, communication and 
persuasion is not covered by the method of analysis. 
Second, the need for plausible (rather than logical) reasoning in design be-
comes evident for example in the comparison of alternative concepts and solu-
tions. The method of analysis has no means to cover this type of reasoning. 
Third, the starting point of analysis is either the task of proving a mathematical 
theorem or the task of drawing a certain geometrical figure. In both cases, the 
question is about a self-contained starting point, presented through unambiguous 
mathematical concepts. Both tasks are universal in the sense that their results are 
applicable and true everywhere and always. Instead, design is about a particular 
need of particular user(s). Thus exploration of that particular case is required at the 
outset of design. Also it is implied that our understanding of a particular case is 
never complete. The stage of making sense of the particular case in question is 
missing from geometric analysis. 
Fourthly, geometric analysis is about the existence and production of a solution 
or about the proof. Design, when it comes to esthetical aspirations, is about influ-
encing the audience. This is also missing from geometric analysis. 
Interestingly, these gaps (except perhaps the third one) exist also in the theoret-
ical landscape of (engineering) design, if not absolutely, so at least as weaknesses. 
However, they all point to the need of embracing another ancient discipline into 
design theorizing, namely rhetoric (Buchanan 1985, Ballard & Koskela 2013, Ko-
skela & Ballard 2013). 
Decision and control/communication 
 Does the proto-theory provide practical tools for design? Does it help in com-
munication? As evidenced in the clarification of the parameter analysis method 
through the proto-theory, the proto-theory seems to provide a more precise termi-
nology in the field of design, than currently available; this supports communica-
tion. But the interpretation of the parameter analysis through the concepts of the 
proto-theory as such shows that the latter have value in contributing to decision 
and control in design. 
Concluding remark 
The conclusion is that the proto-theory fulfills several of the functions of a the-
ory in a superior and fertile way. All in all, it can be contended that this proto-
theory is not only of historical interest, but – still – provides a contribution to the 
theoretical and methodical knowledge on design. 
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Conclusion: the lessons for design theorizing 
Perhaps the most important conclusion for design theorizing is about the signif-
icance of history: there has been a fertile legacy for understanding design but it 
has not been embraced by the movement towards design theorizing that started in 
the 1960’s. It is tempting to draw an analogy to the general history of sciences and 
philosophy: the forgotten and lost legacy from the Antiquity was reintroduced in 
Europe during Renaissance and this crucially triggered development towards En-
lightenment and the modern period.  The intriguing question arises whether we 
will witness a late Renaissance in the discipline of design. Indeed, if we accept 
that the proto-theory of design has been rediscovered, we are compelled to see the 
evolution of design science under a new light. The core theory of design has been 
missing, and although scholars of design have endeavoured to discover it, the pro-
gress has been painfully slow and results fragmented. This missing of the core 
theory has arguably contributed to the maintenance of disciplinary fragmentation 
around design. This situation invites sounding whether the proto-theory of design, 
for its part, could still be used for advancement and unification of design science. 
The argument for unified design science is not new. At the outset, there was a 
unified approach to design and making: the Aristotelian science of production, 
techne. No valid rationale is visible for the current fragmented disciplinary situa-
tion in this field, with engineering design, industrial design, systems engineering, 
new product development and project management having their own communities 
and knowledge bases. It should be possible to unify the many design disciplines 
around their common theoretical basis, or at least pinpoint their connections. In-
deed, the task ahead is to compile a common conceptual and theoretical core for 
the various design and production sciences, and to develop associated ways of 
contextualizing it to specific situations. In this regard, it is interesting to note that 
the view on the ubiquitous nature of design, as recently highlighted by the initia-
tives to establish management as a design science (Boland and Collopy 2004), is 
fully compatible with the original wide scope of techne. 
Another challenge posed by the proto-theory to current theorizing on design is 
about the scope of the phenomenon of design. Most current design theories seem 
narrow in comparison to the proto-theory. On the other hand, the proto-theory 
cannot be claimed to cover the whole area of design; from Antiquity onwards, it 
has been contended that there are aspects and stages in design that are best ap-
proached through rhetoric. The task of agreeing on the boundaries of the phenom-
enon of design seems still to be in front of us. 
Lastly, the proto-theory renders the terminological problems plaguing the dis-
cipline of design visible. The terms analysis and synthesis have maintained a long-
standing prestige, and as the understanding of their original meaning has been cor-
rupted, new meanings have been given to them in different knowledge domains. 
This has led to a fundamental confusion of the role and meaning of analysis and 
synthesis in design. The current popular understanding in design literature of anal-
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ysis as a rational stage and synthesis as a creative stage is in direct contradiction 
with the ancient understanding. In his account on synthesis, Roozenburg (2002) 
recognises those ancient meanings for analysis and synthesis as they have been 
transmitted in the philosophy of science, but comments that this use of those 
words is rather confusing. Unfortunately, it is rather the design field that is using 
those words in a way that is detached from their historical roots. It is opportune to 
clarify this confusion, for the sake of the advancement of the field. 
Acknowledgements 
Discussions with Dr. Ehud Kroll have been useful for clarifying the design in-
terpretation of the features of the method of analysis. The helpful comments by 
two anonymous reviewers are also gratefully acknowledged. 
References 
Aristotle (1924) Aristotle's Metaphysics, a Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by 
WD Ross. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Aristotle (s.a.) Nicomachean ethics [electronic resource]. Available  at: 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html. 
Asimow M (1962) Introduction to design: fundamentals of engineering design, Prentice-Hall. 
Ballard G, Koskela L (2013) Rhetoric and Design. International Conference on Engineering De-
sign (ICED13), Seoul, August 19-22, 2013. 
Barnes J (2000) Aristotle: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press,. 
Beaney M (2009) Analysis, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2009 edn, Zalta 
EN (ed) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/analysis/ 
Boland RJ, Collopy F (2004) Managing as Designing. Stanford University Press. 
Buchanan R (1985) Declaration by design: Rhetoric, argument, and demonstration in design 
practice. Design Issues, 4-22. 
Byrne PH (1997) Analysis and science in Aristotle. Albany: State University of New York Press 
Cavallucci D (2002) TRIZ, the Altshullerian approach to solving innovative problems. In: 
Chakrabarti, A (ed.), Engineering design synthesis: understanding, approaches, and tools. 
London: Springer. 
Cooper JM (1975) Reason and human good in Aristotle. Harvard University Press. Cambridge. 
Cross N (1993) Science and design methodology: A review. Research in engineering design, 
5(2), 63-69. 
Cross N (2000) Engineering design methods: strategies for product design, Wiley 
Forsberg K, Mooz H, Cotterman, H (2005) Visualizing Project Management. Third ed. 
Wiley,Hoboken. 
Galen (1997) The Affections and Errors of the Soul. In: Selected Works. Singer PN (transl) Ox-
ford University Press, pp 120-149. 
Hall AD (1962) A methodology for systems engineering. Princeton. 
Hatchuel A, Weil B (2003) A new approach of innovative design: an introduction to C-K theory. 
In: Proceedings. International Conference on Engineering Design (ICED-03), Stockholm 
Hatchuel A, Weil B (2009) C-K design theory: An advanced formulation. Res in Eng Des 
19(4):181-192 
Hintikka J (2011). Method of Analysis: A Paradigm of Mathematical Reasoning? History and 
Philosophy of Logic 33 (1):49 - 67. 
Hintikka J,  Remes U (1974) The method of analysis: its geometrical origin and its general sig-
nificance. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht. 
Hubka V, Eder WE (1987) Scientific approach to engineering design. Des Stud 8(3):123-137 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Koskela, L (2000). An exploration towards a production theory and its application to construc-
tion. VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. 
Koskela L, Ballard G (2013) The Two Pillars of Design Theory: Method of Analysis and Rheto-
ric. International Conference on Engineering Design (ICED13), Seoul, August 19-22, 2013. 
Kroll E, Condoor SS, Jansson, DG (2001) Innovative conceptual design: theory and application 
of parameter analysis. Cambridge University Press. 
Kroll E, Koskela, L (2012) Interpreting parameter analysis through the proto-theory of design, 
in: 12th International Design Conference DESIGN 2012, May 21-24, 2012, Cavtat, Croatia. 
Menn, S (2002) Plato and the Method of Analysis. Phronesis, vol XLVII, No 3, pp 193-223. 
NSF Report on Engineering Systems Design Workshop (2010) Report on the NSF Engineering 
Systems Design Workshop held on February 22 – 24, 2010. 
Pahl G, Beitz W (1996) Engineering design: a systematic approach, Springer 
Polya G (2004) How to solve it: a new aspect of mathematical method. Princeton University 
Press 
Raftopoulos A (2003) Cartesian analysis and synthesis. Stud in Hist and Philos of Sci 34:265-
308 
Ramaswamy R, & Ulrich K (1993) Augmenting the house of quality with engineering models. 
Research in engineering design, 5(2), 70-79. 
Rasmussen J, Pejtersen AM, Goodstein LP (1994) Cognitive system engineering. John Wiley & 
Sons, New York 
Rescher N (2005) Reductio ad absurdum. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Ritchey T (2006) Problem structuring using computer-aided morphological analysis. Journal of 
the Operational Research Society, 57(7), 792-801. 
Roozenburg, NFM (2002) Defining Synthesis: on the senses and the logic of design synthesis. 
In: Chakrabarti, A (ed.), Engineering Design Synthesis: Understanding, Approaches, and 
Tools. 
Roozenburg NFM, Eekels J (1995) Product design: fundamentals and methods. John Wiley & 
Sons, Chichester. 
Schuetz A (1943) The Problem of Rationality in the Social World. Economica (new series), 
10(38): 130-149. 
Stevens R, Brook P, Jackson K, Arnold S (1998) Systems engineering: coping with complexity. 
London, Prentice-Hall.  
Suh N (2001) Axiomatic design. Oxford University Press. 
Wynn D, Clarkson J (2005) Models of designing. In: Clarkson J, Eckert C (eds) Design process 
improvement: a review of current practice. Springer, London, 34-59 
